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Abstract
This paper provides a critical review of the extensive literature on gainsharing. It
examines the reasons for the fast growth in these programs in recent years and the major
prototypes used in the past. Different theoretical formulations making predictions about the
behavioral consequences and conditions mediating the success of these programs are
discussed and the supporting empirical evidence is examined. The large number of a theoretical
case studies and practitioner reports or gainsharing are also summarized and integrated. The
article concludes with a suggested research agenda for the future.
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Gainsharing has a long history that may be traced back to the 19th century (Welbourne
& Gomez-Mejia, 1988), yet not until recently has it played a major role as a pay-for-performance
system across a broad spectrum of firms. Imberman (1993) reports that at least 2,000 firms are
now using gainsharing, a dramatic increase over a decade ago. Markham, Scott & Little (1992)
found in a survey of 10,000 members of the Society for Human Resource Management (SHRM)
that gainsharing has transcended its original roots in the manufacturing sector and it is currently
used in all industries, including the public sector. A separate survey of SHRM members
conducted by the Alexander Consulting Group (1992) showed that other than health care,
gainsharing is mentioned by HR managers as the most important human resource topic in the
1990s, ahead of employee diversity, corporate culture, work redesign and other contemporary
issues. A survey of Fortune 1,000 firms by Lawler and Cohen (1992) confirms this trend: 39 %
of these companies rely on some form of gainsharing program, a one-third increase over a
similar survey conducted just three years earlier.
Gainsharing is not a single type of incentive program. Rather, it is an umbrella for a
family of aggregate pay-for-performance approaches that link financial rewards for employees to
improvements in the performance of the entire unit. Increasingly these plans are "custom
designed" in each firm; in fact, almost one-half of the gainsharing plans now in existence are
idiosyncratic to the company implementing it (Markham et al., 1992). However, these
customized plans tend to be variants of three traditional types of gainsharing programs to be
described in some detail later: Scanlon (with a strong reliance on employer involvement),
Rucker (which is similar to Scanlon but utilizes a different calculation to distribute bonuses) and
Improshare (with a greater emphasis on the financial bonus rather than on employee
participation per se).
Regardless of the actual plan used, there are several reasons that may account for the
growing popularity of gainsharing. First, an increasing number of firms are moving toward a
team-based work design (e.g., Scarp, 1995). The basic concept of a job may be undergoing a
fundamental change from a prescribed set of tasks and duties assigned to individual workers to
a broad definition of expectations, including a person's ability to perform multiple tasks and be
flexible to contribute to one or more work teams depending on need (Manz & Sims, 1993). This
new emphasis on flexibility and cooperative efforts is conducive to an aggregate incentive plan,
such as gainsharing, that rewards employees for group outcomes (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin,
1992J. While team based incentives may be used, their application is limited by the fact that
teams are often transient, individuals belong to multiple teams, the performance of various
teams is likely to be interdependent, and inter-team competition may be dysfunctional to the
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achievement of overall corporate goals. Gainsharing is particularly well suited to a team
environment because rewards are linked to the performance of the entire unit which reflect the
cumulative contribution of all teams (Welbourne, Balkin, & Gomez-Mejia, in press).
A second reason for the increased use of gainsharing is dissatisfaction with other types
of pay-for-performance systems. In particular, programs to reward individual performance (such
as merit pay and bonuses) more often than not lead to disappointing results (e.g., Cumming,
1995; Mount, 1987; Pearce, Stevenson & Perry, 1985). Many reasons have been advanced for
this dissatisfaction, most notably the difficulty in untangling an individual's contribution from that
of other employees (e.g., Ilgen & Feldman, 1983; Liden & Mitchell, 1983; Yammarino, Dubinsky
& Hartley, 1987); performance measurement problems or supervisory rating errors (e.g., Cardy
& Dobbins, 1993); lack of credibility because many non-perf rmance factors (such as position in
the salary range) enter into these decisions (Schwab & Olson, 1988); and social disruption
engendered by increased competition and disgruntled employees who feel that they deserve
better (Pearce et al., 1985; Hughes, 1986). As firms scramble to find alternative mechanisms to
reward performance, gainsharing is often adopted as a "lesser evil" or as a viable option with
fewer negative side effects (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992).
A third related reason for greater reliance on gainsharing is that these programs are
easier to sell to top management. The out-of-pocket expenses for the firm are generally low
since any payoffs accrued by workers are linked to future unit performance and any realized
gains are distributed between employees and the firm. By definition, any compensation received
by employees under this type of program is variable rather than fixed in nature so that the firm is
not committed to a permanent resource allocation. Employees are made to partially carry the
burden or risks of future performance uncertainty (Graham-Moore & Ross, 1990).
Fourth, there is a long history of experience with gainsharing and firms can easily imitate
these plans by copying or modifying gainsharing programs used by competitors. There is a
large amount of literature documenting technical information on the various formulas employed
by firms and other specific details on how these plans have been administered and
implemented. As we will see later, literally hundreds of case studies have been conducted on
gainsharing, and much of this information is in the public domain. As a whole the published
materials speak highly of gainsharing, inducing other firms to join the bandwagon.
There are several consulting firms that specialize on gainsharing, and the popular
business press often provides prescriptions or recipes on what it takes to launch a successful
gainsharing program. At a public policy level, gainsharing has been endorsed by the White
House Conference on Productivity, the General Accounting Office, and the President's Task
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Force on Industrial Competitiveness (Lawler, 1990). The Canadian government has also
stimulated the growth of gainsharing programs as evidenced by the Royal Commission on the
Economic Union and Development Project's recommendation that it be implemented on a
national basis in an effort to improve productivity (Long, 1989).
Fifth, gainsharing programs offer substantial flexibility in the chosen formulas to
determine the payoff and procedures for distributing gains. For instance, the payoff criteria used
may involve such a widely diverse set of factors as profitability, labor costs, material savings,
meeting deadlines, percent rejects, safety record and customer satisfaction (Masternak, 1993).
Many firms are experimenting with differential distribution of bonuses using such factors as
team performance, seniority, job classification, cooperation, and special achievements
(Harrington & Harrington, 1995; Owens, 1991). The actual procedures to distribute awards are
also varied; these may involve supervisor's ratings, employee-management committees,
cross-functional management teams and peer appraisals (Peck, 1991a,b). This type of creative
experimentation with gainsharing programs allows organizations to circumvent some of the
traditional criticisms of the low motivational impact of aggregate incentives, namely that "free
riding" and a "weak line of vision" between behavior and outcome reduce their reinforcement
value.
Lastly, some forms of gainsharing provide an operational mechanism to implement
participative management. The desirability of employee involvement has its roots in the human
relations movement as exemplified in the Hawthorne experiments of the 1920's. Despite much
lip-service to this concept over the years, participative management has been more of an
academic than a practical reality (Gomez-Mejia, Balkin, & Cardy, 1995). Gainsharing represents
a major exception. Many gainsharing plans contain a committee structure to elicit and evaluate
employee suggestions thereby providing an efficient channel to promote employee involvement
and convert it into an action plan.
The purpose of this article is to review the literature on gainsharing and elaborate a
future research agenda. Several earlier reviews have been conducted but most of these are
based on a select number of case studies (Bullock & Lawler, 1984; revisited in a later paper by
Bullock & Tubbs, 1990), focus on a historical narrative of these plans (Gowen, 1990), or tend to
be applied in nature (Graham-Moore & Ross, 1990; Welbourne & Gomez-Mejia, 1988). The
present manuscript reviews a total of 162 publications on gainsharing encompassing six
decades. The information was gathered from a variety of sources, including computer data
bases (e.g., ABI- nform, Infotrac, Psych abstracts, ERIC, and ECONLIT) in addition to a
thorough examination of the major journals in the field. Particular emphasis is given to more
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recent work, most of it less than ten years old and not yet integrated. This contemporary
literature has a stronger theoretical flavor than earlier publications which as a whole were
largely descriptive and prescriptive.
We divide the review into four sections. First, we provide a brief description of
gainsharing prototypes; most programs include features of these plans. While this material is
already familiar to many readers, it provides a context for the subsequent literature review.
Second, we examine several theoretical perspectives that have recently been used as
explanatory frameworks to assess the antecedents and consequences of gainsharing
outcomes. Empirical evidence, if any, is also presented in light of hypothesized relationships.
Third, we examine the vast atheoretical literature on gainsharing, most of it consisting of case
studies, exploratory research, descriptive surveys, and other practitioner publications. This body
of information, when coupled with the theory based research reviewed in the preceding section,
provides a more comprehensive assessment of the impact of gainsharing and conditions
favoring its success. The article concludes with a discussion section that addresses research
gaps identified in the literature review and that raises interesting questions on gainsharing that
are important both from a scholarly and applied perspective.
GAINSHARING PROGRAMS
Gainsharing generally consist of two components: A financial formula that serves as the
basis for the bonus system and some type of formal employee involvement program. As noted
earlier, many firms are developing their own customized gainsharing plans. These are usually a
variant of one of the gainsharing programs described next: Scanlon, Rucker, and Improshare.
Gainsharing Formulas
The Scanlon plan utilizes a fairly simple formula, which is considered to be one of the
advantages of this program because it is easily calculated, administered, and understood by
employees. The concept behind the Scanlon formula is that increases in labor productivity
should be shared with employees. Therefore, the formula first seeks to secure a stable and
historical ratio representing productivity, which is usually measured as the ratio of labor costs to
either revenues, net sales, or sales value of production. The simple calculation is often referred
to as the "single ratio"; the formula may also be modified by including other costs such as
materials, overhead, rejects and the like. Gains in productivity that result from either increases
in production or cost savings are shared with the workers when the observed ratio is less than
the historical ratio (Doyle, 1983).
The ratio used by organizations that implement the Rucker plan is slightly different.
According to Metzger (1985) "the Rucker Plan pays a bonus when a value added gain is
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realized. Value added is defined as sales minus raw materials and services procured outside
the company" (p. 11). The Rucker plan is similar to the single ratio Scanlon plan in that the
numerator is the same (labor costs); however, the Rucker plan attempts to account for the
increased value of sales (due to the market factors, inflation, etc., not attributed to efforts made
by employees) and the costs of materials and supplies (also due to factors in the external
environment, unrelated to workers' efforts) by including both of these factors in the denominator.
Therefore, inflationary and market effects theoretically are cancelled out. The ratio used under
Rucker is as follows:
Labor Costs/Value Added (Sales - Raw Materials)
According to the formula above, when labor costs (numerator) as a percentage of the
value of production or sales (denominator) decrease, then a bonus pool is established. Graham-
Moore and Ross (1990) provide an example of a single ratio monthly report that shows the
allowed payroll costs (based on an analysis of the historical data) to be 20 % . Actual payroll
costs for the period, based on a value of production of $1,200,000, are $210,000 (17.5%). The
allowed payroll cost (based on the established ratio of 20% and production valued at
$1,200,000) is $240,000. Therefore, the savings for this period are $30,000 (240,000-210, 00).
This could also be calculated using the percentage savings of {20% - 17.5 = 2.5%
(1,200,000)} = $30,000.
After the bonus pool is established (whether through the Scanlon or Rucker formula), it
is distributed between employees and the organization. The employee share of the bonus pool
typically range between 25 % and 75 % , and bonus payments can be paid on weekly, monthly,
or quarterly schedules. A percentage of the employee bonus is normally retained in a reserve
fund, which is then distributed at the end of the year in the event that a positive balance
remains. The bonus pool is most commonly distributed to employees participating in the plan as
a percentage of their wages; in a few cases organizations have opted to split the bonus pool
equally among all employees who participate in the program.
Improshare (improved production through sharing) focuses on sharing physical
productivity gains with employees. Standard hours are calculated for the manufacturing of each
product, and a bonus is earned when the hours required to produce units decline by employees.
Mitchell Fein (1991) provided an example of an Improshare gain where 100 employees
produced 50,000 units over a period of 50 weeks (200,000 hours needed to produce 50,000
units). These numbers are used to calculate the "base", which is 200,000/50,000 or 4.0 hours
per product. The base represents the expected amount of hours worked to produce one unit.
During the period after Improshare is implemented, it is assumed that 102 employees produce
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1,300 units in 4,080 hours. According to the base calculated earlier, the value of this new
production is 1,300 units x 4.0 (base) = 5,200 hours. The 5,200 hours represent the amount of
time that, according to the base, the firm anticipates are required to produce the 1,300 units of
production. Given an observed production time of 4,080 hours, a gain exists, which is split
between the employees and management (5,200 - 4, 80 = 1,120 hours). This gain of 1,120
hours is split 50/50 between employees and management. The calculation then used to
determine what each individual employee bonus will be is 560 (employee share of the savings) /
4,080 (actual hours worked), which is 13.7 per cent. Workers earn a corresponding bonus that
equals 13.7% of their time worked (40 hours x 13.7 % = 5.48 hours); the hours are then
multiplied by the employee's hourly wage to determine the precise value of the payout.
The Involvement System
Most gainsharing plans, particularly the Scanlon and Rucker variety, recommend the
installation of two tiers of suggestion committees, each empowered to approve suggestions
submitted by workers.
The first tier committee is usually at the department level; suggestion committee
members are normally elected by department members. It is the responsibility of these
committees to encourage employees to make suggestions, and once received, review them,
investigate if needed, and make final decisions on whether to implement the suggestion after
careful cost/benefit analysis. If the cost of implementing the suggestion exceeds that of their
budget authority, the suggestion is submitted to the second tier committee, which normally
consists of a member from each of the first tier committees and a representative from top
management. Suggestions having a favorable impact on the gainsharing formula result in bonus
payments to the workers covered under the plan.
Now that we have examined the basic operational elements of gainsharing programs,
the next section focuses on why and how gainsharing affects employee behaviors and
conditions that are conducive to its successful implementation.
THEORY BASED LITERATURE
The theory based literature on gainsharing is diverse, encompassing both conceptual
and empirical articles. Among the latter group, a wide ranging spectrum of methodologies is
used including surveys, single case studies, multiple case studies, and experimental designs. 
The ensuing literature review is organized around major theoretical perspectives which
are also rather varied; these are grouped into three broad categories depending on their
disciplinary roots, namely psychology, organization theory, and economics. Exhibit 1 highlights
this material in terms of central focus, key hypotheses, and supporting evidence.
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Exhibit 1
GAINSHARING: SUMMARY OF THEORETICAL VIEWS AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES PRIMARY FOCUS CENTRAL HYPOTHESIS RESEARCH AMOUNT EMPIRICAL SUPPORT
Socio-Psychological
1. Participative management Interpersonal relations Participation under gainsharing leads Extensive Generally supportive
to greater employee commitment,
creativity, and performance.
2. Expectancy theory Cognitive reactions Employees' predisposition toward Very limited Generally supportive
gainsharing and observed behavioral
response are a function of personal
expectancies
3. Need theory Internal drives Effectiveness of gainsharing depends Minimal Generally supportive
on extent to which it fulfills employees'
needs.
4. Operant conditioning Reinforcement schedule Behavioral impact of gainsharing depends Unavailable Unavailable
on provision of social and financial
reinforcement plus timely feedback.
5. Social dilemma Free riding/personal Group allocation of rewards induces Minimal Generally supportive
responsibility greater individual efforts and
reduces freeriding.
6. Equity/justice theory Perceived fairness Effectiveness of gainsharing depends Minimal Supportive
on perceived procedural/distributive justice
Organizational
7. Structural External/contextual factors Ex-ante situational variables determine Very limited Mixed
relative success or failure of gainsharing
8. Contingency theory Congruency/consistency Effectiveness of gainsharing is a Very limited Generally supportive
function of its fit with organizational
idiosyncrasies and other human
resource practices.
9. Social field theory Social antecedents Gainsharing is most likely to be Very limited Generally supportive
successfully implemented under
strong pre-existing norms of high
cooperation/high participation.
Behavioral Economics
10. Agency theory Control Mutual monitoring induced by Very limited Generally supportive
gainsharing reduces agency costs.
11. Prospect theory Framing of situation Employees' behavioral response to Unavailable Unavailable
gainsharing depends on perceived
gain/loss context of decision making
   situation
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Socio-Psychological Perspectives
Theoretical views falling in this category examine employee reactions to gainsharing in
light of how they perceive the gainsharing program and how it affects them personally. These
perspectives include the human relations/participative management school, expectancy theory,
operant conditioning, need theory, equity theory, social dilemma, and procedural justice. Each
of these is discussed in turn.
Participative Management
The oldest stream of theory based research on gainsharing focuses on the basic notion
that inducing employees to cooperate by giving them voice and a chance to participate in
important decisions regarding their jobs is likely to augment commitment to the organization,
improve work motivation, and enhance overall productivity. Employees understand their jobs far
better than management and tapping this knowledge through gainsharing offers an important
means to increase organizational performance.
This view can be traced back to the classical writings of Mayo (1945) and his followers
who argued that ". . . the administrator is dealing with well-knit human groups and not with a
horde of individuals. . . every social group must face two perpetual and recurrent problems of
administration. It must secure for its individual and group membership: (1) the satisfaction of
material and economic needs, and (2) the maintenance of spontaneous cooperation throughout
the organization (p. 9) . . . the eager human desire for cooperative activity still persists in the
ordinary person and can be used by intelligent and straightforward management . . . " (p. 112)
Gainsharing provides a medium to accomplish this by aligning the cooperation imperative of
workers (through suggestion committee structures) with the objectives of the organization
(through the criteria used to trigger payoffs) while at the same time satisfying the material and
economic needs of workers (through the bonus system).
The notion that "genuine participation by the workers in regard to substantial matters is a
good thing" (Cummings & Molloy, 1977: 236) is a common thread in this literature, much of it
concerned with the Scanlon plan described earlier. A total of ten empirical studies are reviewed
next which follow from this theoretical tradition (see Exhibit 2).
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Exhibit 2
PARTICIPATIVE DECISION MAKING (PDM) BASED STUDIES
AUTHOR(S) INDEPENDENT DEPENDENT
VARIABLES VARIABLES
Wallace (1971) Scanlon plan implementationManagement attitudes
toward employees and
PDM
Burtnett (1973) Commitment to Scanlon Employee influence
plan
White & Ruh (1973) PDM and values Job involvement,
motivation, identification
with org.
Ruh, White, & Wood Job involvement Motivation, identity
(1975)
Ruh, Johnson, & Scontrino Participation through Job involvement,
(1973) Scanlon Plan motivation,
identification
Ruh, Wallace, & Frost Gainsharing retention Management attitudes
(1973) toward employees and
PDM
Schuster (1984a; 1984b; Scanlon Plan Production,
1985) implementation turnover,
absenteeism,
bonus,
suggestions
Hatcher, Ross, & Collins Pro-social behaviors, Suggestion making activity
(1989) job complexity
The first four studies sought to explore the types of employee attitudes that, based on
previous research and theory, should be present in organizations with participative decision
making environments. Wallace (1971) surveyed 205 managers in 10 companies with Scanlon
plans and in 8 firms that had discontinued the Scanlon plan. He hypothesized that managers in
firms that had retained the Scanlon plan would have better morale than managers in firms
without the plan. The results confirmed his hypotheses by discovering that managers in firms
with existing Scanlon plans showed more favorable attitudes toward the firm, workers, and
participative decision making in general. Although the results were consistent with his
hypotheses it is not clear whether management attitudes were causally related to Scanlon plan
retention or that the retention of the Scanlon plan resulted in a change in attitudes.  Burtnett
(1973) drew extensively from the participative decision making research to test a series of
hypotheses whereby "the basic proposition underlying all hypotheses is simply that the
perceived level of a certain organizational climate variable at one point in time is a contributing
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cause of the perceived level of a certain influence variable at a subsequent point in time during
the implementation of a Scanlon plan" (p. 60). The results of his survey indicated that the
employees' perceived level of commitment to the Scanlon plan (at time one) was the principal
cause of perceived level of influence after the plan was in effect (at time two). The perception of
the link between suggestions and the bonus payment at time one was also found to be a cause
of perceived influence at time two.
White and Ruh (1973) developed a set of hypotheses stating that individual values
should moderate the relationship between extent of participation and job attitudes. Their study
focused on the role of ten individual values measured in a sample of employees working for six
manufacturing firms that had implemented the Scanlon plan. The results indicated that
individual values were directly related to employee participation, but their hypotheses stating
that individual values acted as moderator between participation and job attitudes were not
supported.
Ruh, White, and Wood (1975), in a study of 2,755 employees working in firms with
Scanlon plans, investigated the relationship between job involvement, personal background, life
values, and participative decision making. After reviewing the literature on participation in the
workplace, they argued for a need to investigate the role of individual differences and
hypothesized that job involvement should moderate the relationship between participation and
job attitudes. Their results found correlational relationships between job involvement and the
other variables included, but they did not substantiate the idea that job involvement acted as a
moderator variable. Ruh et al. concluded that "job involvement may not be the appropriate
moderator" or that "job involvement is not a stable value orientation brought to the job" (p. 311);
therefore, in their opinion the findings should spur additional research to examine other potential
individual level moderator variables.
Two studies specifically addressed Lowin's (1968) model of participative decision
making which, according to Ruh, Johnson, and Scontrino (1973) "is basically a model of
organizational change, the primary focus of which is on the conditions (i.e., the organizational,
situational, and individual difference variables), which may facilitate or hinder change toward
more participative decision making oriented systems of organization" (p. 2). Lowin's model
places emphasis on the role of employee and management attitudes toward participative
decision making and how those attitudes may affect the success of organizational change
efforts. Ruh, et al. (1973) surveyed 2,488 employees in six different organizations to explore the
relationship between attitudes toward participation through the Scanlon plan and three other job
attitudes (job involvement, motivation, and identification with organization). They found support
Gainsharing                                                                                                                                                                WP 95-10
Page 13
for correlational relationships between the variables specified above, but the causal order
remained an open question.
An additional partial test of Lowin's model was conducted by Ruh, Wallace, and Frost
(1973). They hypothesized that management attitudes should be related to gainsharing success
and surveyed managers in 18 firms that had experience with Scanlon plans. Their results
indicated that managers in firms that had retained the Scanlon plan had more favorable
attitudes toward employees and participative decision making than managers in firms that had
discontinued the plan. Both of these studies are cross-sectional, post-hoc, correlational designs
that do not provide a strong test of causation.
Three studies, although not rooted directly on the participative decision making
paradigm, utilized a model that is based on the parallel concept of union-management
cooperation. Schuster (1984„ 1984b, 1985) relied on the Kochan-Dyer (1976) stage model that
details the conditions under which unions and management might consider a joint venture.
Hypotheses developed from the model were then tested in firms with Scanlon plans. His
empirical tests, utilizing an interrupted time series design, generally found favorable
organizational outcomes after Scanlon plan implementation (increases in productivity, stable
employment levels, bonus payments, and increased suggestion activity) attributable to improved
labor-management cooperation.
The tenth and last study in this category relied upon the pro-social rganizational
behavior literature, which in this case was applied to suggestion making activity, considered by
the authors to be a form of participation. Hatcher, Ross, and Collins (1989) reviewed the
literature on pro-social behaviors and concluded that although suggestion making activity was
considered a form of pro-s cial behavior it had not been investigated to date by researchers in
the field. Given the importance of this activity in gainsharing environments, their study was
designed to "identify some of the correlates of participation in gainsharing plan involvement
systems" (p. 233). Hatcher et al. (1989) surveyed employees in five manufacturing firms with
gainsharing plans. They found that suggestion making activity was correlated with other
assisting behaviors, indicating that employees with a propensity toward one type of pro-social
behavior tended to engage in similar activities. This relationship was moderated by job
complexity, with high levels of assisting behavior being related to higher suggestion making
activities for employees in jobs considered to be more complex.
In summary, a variety of studies have examined the role of participative decision making
or a similar concept (e.g., union-management cooperation, pro-social behaviors) within a
gainsharing environment. While results are somewhat mixed, for the most part they suggest that
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employee participation may be an important variable affecting the success of gainsharing
programs. Three caveats are worth mentioning, however. First, the procedures used almost
always leave open the question of causality and methodological artifacts (such as method
variance, internal attributions, and social desirability biases), may account for some (perhaps
most) of the positive findings. Second, because these studies are concerned with participative
decision making, they do not attempt to tease out the singular and interactive roles of the bonus
and employee involvement systems that are present in gainsharing environments. The role of
the bonus system should not be underestimated (Geare, 1976; Hamner, 1988). Third, given the
strong focus on the individual as the unit of analysis, this research has generally failed to take
into amount the work group effect that should be present in a gainsharing environment
(Welbourne, et al., in press)
Expectancy Theory.
Two studies conducted by Goodman and Moore (1976) and Moore and Goodman
(1972) relied on expectancy theory to develop a learning model that posits individual,
organizational, and interpersonal variables as predictors of employee reactions to Scanlon
plans. Their model argues that employee perceptions of gainsharing is the result of two
expectancies: (1) system expectancy (the perception that suggestion making is linked to
receiving a bonus) and (2) self expectancy (the perception that an individual can submit a
suggestion if effort is exerted). Goodman and Moore (1976) commented that "most research in
this area has focused on predicting behavior from expectancies; this paper treats expectancies
as the dependent variables" (p. 574). Their results indicated that individual level antecedent
variables (e.g., education and understanding of reward system) affected managers' beliefs
about the Scanlon plan while blue collar employees' beliefs were influenced more by
organizational and interpersonal variables (e.g., nature of task, type of group) .
Because of its narrow focus on individual cognitive processes this line of work has not
produced an extensive stream of research, such as that generated by the participative
management models. Yet it reminds us that individual and demographic differences should not
be ignored when testing hypothesis concerning gainsharing outcomes. As a case in point,
Hatcher, Ross, and Collins (1991) interviewed 149 supervisors and non-management
employees in five gainsharing companies; they found marked differences in individuals'
willingness to be involved in the generation and assessment of suggestions. The key variable
explaining this predisposition was the employee's instrumentality belief, that is "the perception
that the gainsharing system either benefits or works to the detriment of a given individual's
interest" (p. 40). Interestingly enough, the expectancy most often mentioned by employees as a
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determinant of suggestion activity in this study is congruent with the participative management
perspective reviewed earlier. The perceived ability to collaboratively improve performance and
become involved in work decisions is the main predictor of suggestion activity with "the desire
for influence more influential than the desire for bonuses" (Hatcher et al., 1991: 41). A caveat
similar to that mentioned earlier under the participative management discussion also applies
here. The nature of the methodology used would tend to increase social desirability biases
because individuals may attribute their willingness to be involved to "good" things (e.g., ability to
help others and make personal contributions) without publicly acknowledging private motives
with negative connotations (such as selfish greed as reflected in the desire to attain a bonus).
Need Theory
Along similar lines to the research reviewed above, some investigators have noted that
individual needs mediate the relationship between gainsharing and its outcomes. To the extent
that the gainsharing plan satisfies an individual's needs, the more likely the employee will
respond in the desired direction. One study, conducted by Dreher (1980), relied on individual
need theory as specified by Murray (1938) and later expanded by McClelland et al. (1953) and
Atkinson (1958) to examine the relationship between individual need strength with job
satisfaction and job involvement. The study was conducted in a firm with a modified Scanlon
plan and measured four needs: achievement, affiliation, autonomy, and dominance. Dreher
found that all of the needs except the need for affiliation correlated significantly with both job
satisfaction and job involvement. After reviewing the results, the author suggested that
"individual differences may play an important role in understanding the Scanlon plan process"
(p. 93). Once again, this conclusion serves as an admonition to those who propose a
generalized approach to gainsharing based on what may prove to be simplistic assumptions
concerning employees' predisposition (e.g., universal desire to participate in a team context).
Unfortunately very little research has been conducted along these lines even though Dreher's
study was published 15 years ago.
Operant Conditioning
A recent theoretical article by Mawhinney and Gowen (1991) focuses on the pecuniary
properties of gainsharing from a reinforcement perspective. Using operant conditioning
principles drawn from the experimental psychology literature, these authors argue that most
effective gainsharing programs meet three criteria. First, the bonus should follow
accomplishment of performance targets with minimal delays. Second, the work group should
provide social reinforcement for high performance. Lastly, the negative effects of delayed
rewards should be mitigated through system components that provide feedback. In other words,
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feedback can compensate for delayed reinforcements under gainsharing. While empirical tests
of these notions remain to be conducted, this paper brings into sharp focus the importance of
examining reinforcement schedules in gainsharing programs--something that is largely ignored
in the models reviewed so far.
Social Dilemma
One of the concerns with aggregate incentive systems such as gainsharing is the so
called "free-riding" effect whereby individuals accrue the benefits of the group effort and this
serves as a disincentive to individual efforts (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992a). In the terminology
of Cooper, Dyck, & Frohlich (1992), gainsharing creates a social dilemma because employees
can benefit from an improvement in group performance regardless of their personal contribution
to that performance. In a manner akin to the participative management models, Cooper et al.,
argue that this social dilemma may be solved through group decision making to decide how
rewards are to be allocated within the group.  Specifically, "when people participate in
developing a rule of distribution of income, they will choose to take into account both the needs
of the least productive and the entitlements of the higher achievers" (Cooper et al., 1992: 473).
According to the authors, only when this condition is met will the organization realize significant
productivity gains. Any distribution rules imposed from outside the group will not produce the
same effect; in fact, they are likely to augment a social dilemma whereby individual and group
incentives diverge.
Cooper et al. found support for the above proposition in a lab experiment with students
as subjects. The generalizability of the findings to large, complex organizations remains to be
shown. However, their essential message (that intrateam allocation of rewards is important to
reduce free-riding) has enormous implications for the design of gainsharing programs. It
complements participative management models by emphasizing the importance of differential
distribution of aggregate rewards as part of the group decision making process.
Equity and Justice Theories
The central argument in this literature is that employees' response to gainsharing
depends on their perceptions of the program's fairness. About 20 years ago, Geare (1976)
criticized much of the earlier literature on gainsharing because it deemphasized and
underestimated the importance of pecuniary rewards. He argued that much of the previous
research advocated participation as key to gainsharing success, ignoring the incentive
properties of the bonus. Geare pointed out, after reviewing mixed research evidence of the role
of participation in decision making, that it is the lure of money rather than the appeal of
participation that leads to changes in employee behaviors in response to gainsharing. As a
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corollary, Geare noted that perception of equity is a necessary precondition for the gainsharing
bonus to induce desired employee behaviors.
Hammer (1988) presented a model of gainsharing based on Geare's ideas. According to
Hamner's model the bonus provides the impetus for participation, which is the key to change in
employee effort. The model indicates that the bonus acts to influence participation when it is
promised and again when it is received. In other words, the promise of equity in the contractual
relationship between employer and employee creates the conditions for participation to occur. In
turn, participation can only be sustained if appropriate reward contingencies exist that are
perceived as equitable.
Welbourne et al. (in press) expand on this theme by drawing from the justice literature in
organizational behavior which argues that perceived fairness of outcomes and procedures
exerts a strong influence on how employees react to gainsharing. From this perspective the
effectiveness of gainsharing in terms of eliciting desired employee behavior depends on the joint
presence of distributive and procedural justice. The process through which decisions are made
forms the basis of perceived procedural justice. This is in contrast to the concept of distributive
justice which is concerned with the perceived fairness of the consequences of those decisions
(i.e., gainsharing bonus).
An empirical study by Welbourne et al. (in press) based on two samples of workers
drawn from two firms using two different types of gainsharing programs (one similar to a
Scanlon Plan and one analogous to Improshare) found support for the notion that employees'
participation (in terms of suggestion activity and job involvement) is a positive function of both
distributive and procedural justice. These authors concluded that workers are more likely to
contribute if they believe that high rewards are commensurate with those efforts (distributive
justice). Likewise, lack of perceived procedural fairness creates a cognitive discrepancy for the
employees involved, lowering their relative contribution to the program. While both forms of
justice are important, the authors found in a manner consistent with the organizational justice
literature (e. g., Folger & Konovsky, 1989) that in a gainsharing plan the perceived fairness of
procedures may be more important to workers than the perceived fairness of outcomes
received.
In summary, the equity and justice based models serve to link the gainsharing literature
to much of the "mainstream" organizational behavior and compensation research that accords
perceived fairness a pivotal role. These models also raise a red flag concerning the dangers
involved with the implementation of gainsharing programs which do not explicitly take into
account employees' perceptions of the rewards. They also provide a complementary theoretical
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structure to strengthen the conceptual power of the participative gainsharing models. This is
because employee involvement in the design of the gainsharing program and the allocation of
rewards is highly correlated with procedural justice, which in turn affects extent and value of
future participation (Welbourne et al., in press).
Organizational Perspective
The organizational perspective focuses on gainsharing at the firm level of analysis or at
the interface between the firm and its environment. The effectiveness of gainsharing is analyzed
primarily in terms of contextual factors. This literature may be divided into three categories,
which are discussed in turn: structural, contingency, and social fields.
Structural Models
Structural models argue that organizational factors or conditions that exist prior to
implementation of gainsharing ultimately determine its relative success. Therefore gainsharing
has little chance of succeeding unless these ex-ante conditions are explicitly addressed in the
design and implementation phases. A key concern in this literature is the identification of those
a priori factors that facilitate or hinder the effective execution of gainsharing.
The best known structural model of gainsharing was introduced by Frost, Wakeley, and
Ruh (1974), who accumulated data and expertise as a result of their consulting experience with
a number of firms installing gainsharing plans. They relied on their experience as consultants
and the organizational development literature to create a complex model that includes identity
(employee identification with the organization), participation (participative decision making),
equity (fair renumeration), and managerial competence (the ability of managers to do their jobs)
as necessary preconditions of gainsharing success or effectiveness.  Although Frost et al.'s
model has generated a considerable amount of interest, Schuster (1983a) comments that it "has
not proven useful for generating or testing hypotheses" (p. 59). In fact, the only empirical test
conducted to date that has been directly linked to their model was generated by Greenwood
(1977) who developed an instrument to measure the four constructs proposed in the model.
Using a survey methodology, their results indicated that scores on all four constructs were
higher in firms that introduced and retained Scanlon plans. Unfortunately, the cross-sectional
nature of the design does not allow for any inference of causation; it is not known whether the
levels of identity, participation, equity, and managerial competence were determinants of
gainsharing plan retention or whether gainsharing plan installation and retention caused the
changes to occur.
Graham-Moore and Ross (1983) proposed an analogous model to predict gainsharing
success. They list organizational (climate, size, technology, policy, reward systems, identity),
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socio-cultural-institutional (union and industrial relations climate, workforce characteristics,
external environmental, geographic factors), individual (managerial philosophy, trust, locus of
control, skill level, motivation, satisfaction), and financial (accuracy, budgets, control, knowledge
of competition, government constraints, etc.) variables as factors that determine gainsharing
success or failure.
Bullock and Lawler (1984) adopted a similar approach and developed a comprehensive
model of gainsharing based on their review of 33 case studies. They categorized the
determinants of gainsharing success as being either (1) structural (suggestion committees,
financial formula, payout percentage, etc.), (2) implementation (employee involvement,
objectives, use of interventionist, etc.), or (3) situational (size, union status, management style,
technology, environment, etc.) factors. A subsequent reexamination of these 33 plans by
Bullock and Tubbs (1990) using a case meta-analytic technique indicated that four structural
features predicted gainsharing success: employee involvement in plan design, use of outside
practitioners, formal involvement structures, and employee favorability toward the plan. The
authors conclude that "with the exception of participative management style, situational
conditions did not correlate with gainsharing's success. Success was robust across
organizational size, union status, technology and environment." (p. 384).
This literature contributes to our understanding of gainsharing by reminding us that these
plans should not be introduced (or indeed studied) as stand alone entities without
simultaneously examining other organizational factors that may singularly or interactively affect
their success. However, this literature suffers on three counts: First, the empirical tests, so far,
leave open the question of causality. Second, the identified factors (perhaps because of their
global, often amorphous nature) are difficult to measure and the theoretical constructs
themselves are subject to a wide range of interpretations. Third, it tends to neglect the
possibility that the gainsharing program may be introduced as a change agent to alter the
conditions which have been identified as prejudicial to these plans (such as low employee
identification with the firm and lack of control or empowerment).
Contingency Theory
Contingency theory as applied to gainsharing dovetails the structural models discussed
above. The central tenet of contingency theory is that lack of fit between two or more elements
of a system reduces its overall effectiveness. In other words, the performance of the system in
total is a direct function of the match between its various components. In the special case of
gainsharing, effectiveness is predicated on its fit with other organizational factors, rather than as
an independent phenomena that can be examined out of context.
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Empirical tests of these contingency notions specifically applied to gainsharing are hard
to find. Yet, indirect evidence is supportive of a contingency approach to the study of
gainsharing. A study by MacDuffie (1994) of 70 automobile assembly plants led the author to
conclude that "bundles of interrelated/internally consistent HR practices are the appropriate unit
of analysis for studying the link [of gainsharing] to performance--rather than individual
practices--because they create the multiple, mutually reinforcing conditions that support
employee motivation/skill acquisition" (p. 3).
A similar study was conducted by Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (1994) using a
sample of 45 business units in 21 steel manufacturing companies. In a manner analogous to
MacDuffie (1994), these authors concluded that "systems of complementary HRM practices
raise firm's productivity. These effects of HRM systems are much larger than the productivity
effects due to individual practices. Firms cannot make marginal decisions with regard to HRM
practices but instead will realize the largest increases in productivity from making discrete jumps
in the use of clusters of practices" (p. 6). Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1992a) reviewed several
earlier compensation studies that agree with these contingency notions.
In summary, contingency theory provides a well established conceptual framework with
a wealth of prior empirical studies in diverse areas that can be readily applied to study the fit
between various types of gainsharing programs and contextual factors, and how their
congruency affects observed results. Thus it can provide more rigor to the structural factors
approach reviewed earlier. Several empirical techniques are available to examine degree of
congruency or fit (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992a); unfortunately these require large sample
sizes, limiting their application to gainsharing because the firm (rather than the individual) is the
unit of analysis.
Social Fields
This perspective is based on Lewin's (1947) social field theory. The objective is to
explain whether or not gainsharing is more likely to be implemented and be effective under
favorable conditions, or whether it can be introduced successfully under adverse conditions that
management desires to change.
Collins, Hatcher and Ross (1993) developed two competing gainsharing models along
this line. The first model, labeled compatibility, argues that gainsharing is most likely to be
introduced and be successful in facilities with the fewest restraining forces (i.e., most favorable
conditions). "In this sense, gainsharing boosts the facility from a good to a relatively better level
of operations" (Collins et al., 1993: 79). At the opposite extreme, a transformation model
predicts that gainsharing is most likely to be adopted and have the greatest positive effects on
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the organization in facilities with the greatest restraining forces (i.e., unfavorable conditions such
as a negative work climate that management wishes to change). Under the transformation
model, the objective of gainsharing is to raise the facility ". . . from a relatively poor level of
operations to a relatively better level of operations. It is consistent with other models of
organizational change which state that innovations are more likely to be adopted and/or
succeed when there is a strong perception of a need for change" (Collins et al., 1993: 80).
The authors tested these competing models by collecting data on work climate (e.g.,
participation levels) via a survey of 485 upper level managers in 59 facilities. Of these 59
facilities, 17 subsequently implemented a gainsharing program. The results showed no support
for the transformation hypothesis and weak support for a compatibility explanation. The authors
concluded that "while gainsharing is often promoted as a means for achieving greater levels of
involvement, the present results suggest that it is more likely to actually be implemented in
settings where there are already higher levels of cooperation and in nonunion facilities where
there are already higher levels of participation" (p. 101).
The longitudinal design of Collins et al.'s study is a rarity in the gainsharing literature and
clearly is an improvement over much of the cross-sectional work that has been reviewed up to
this point. Lewin's social field notion also provides additional insights concerning the precursors
of gainsharing and its effectiveness. However, the conclusion of the study needs to be tempered
by the fact that the sample size was small and no data was available on the effectiveness of
gainsharing, only the implementation rate. For instance, it is possible that gainsharing as an
intervention may have the greatest positive effects on reversing dysfunctional conditions (e.g., a
negative work climate and low employee participation). Yet these adverse conditions may act as
restraining forces reducing the probability that gainsharing is introduced in the first place.
Economic Perspective
The body of literature taking an economic perspective to gainsharing is minimal, yet
organizational economics offers some powerful analytical models that may provide some
important insights in this domain. Two of these conceptual frameworks are discussed next:
agency and behavioral theory of the firm.
Agency Theory
An agency relationship involves any situation where decision making responsibility is
delegated to a second party for a fee (Zajac, 1990). Examples of agency relationships include:
professionals and clients, insured and insurer, shareholders and management, and society with
a polluting firm (Shavell, 1979). Jensen and Meckling (1976) extend the definition by noting that
Gainsharing                                                                                                                                                                WP 95-10
Page 22
any cooperative situation, even those that are not obviously a principal-agent relationship (e.g.,
volunteer organizations, co-authoring a paper), can be considered as such.
Within an organization an agency relationship exists not only between the owners and
top management but also between the managers and employees. Eisenhardt (1985), for
example, applied the concept of agency in a study of pay practices for retail salespeople in a
sample of 54 stores, thus extending the concept beyond owners and top executives. Gomez-
Mejia and Balkin (1992b) studied faculty pay allocations in an agency context with faculty
portrayed as agents and the administration as principals. As discussed below, gainsharing
programs can also be analyzed in terms of the agency relationships that are present.
Agency costs
The problem of agency results from the assumed utility maximizing behavior of both
principals and agents. Moral hazard is one type of agency problem that may be attributed to the
purported self-serving and opportunistic behavior of the agents (Kotowitz, 1989). The work
environment is described as a situation where agents can make decisions to maximize their self
interest, often at the expense of the owners or principals (Barney & Ouchi, 1986). The term
moral hazard originated in the insurance industry, where an insurance policy created incentive
for the insured to cause an accident (such as an intentional fire) (Arrow, 1985).
Moral hazard and adverse selection, the second agency problem, result from information
asymmetries that provide one party (agents) with information that is not available to the second
party (principals) (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992b). Adverse selection refers to the principals'
inability to make correct decisions because they do not have complete information on a
work-related subject. For instance, the concept is often applied to the topic of hiring. Principals
do not have complete information on the agent (who may withhold critical information on the
agent's mistakes) and can only infer their qualifications from data provided by the agent (Zajac,
1990). This could result in decisions that are less than optimal from the principal's perspective.
Agency theory thus focuses on how to reduce the agency problem, which translates into
minimization of agency costs. Agency costs include: 1) monitoring costs incurred by the
principal in an effort to keep abreast of the actions of the agent (e.g., hiring supervisors,
implementing incentive systems, enacting budget controls, etc., 2) bonding costs incurred
primarily by the agent (but often the principal must incur some administrative costs such as
audits) to guarantee the principal that the agent is not performing outside the boundaries
intended by the agent; and 3) residual loss, which is defined as the inevitable loss incurred by
the principal because it is impossible for principals to use monitoring or bonding arrangements
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to guarantee 100% full compliance by the agent (Barney & Ouchi, 1986; Dyl, 1988). Thus, from
the perspective of the principal, the equation to be minimized is as follows:
Agency Costs = f(M + B + R),
where M=monitoring; B=bonding; R=residual loss When the principal makes no attempt
to minimize agency costs through the use of monitoring and bonding agreements, the total cost
is equivalent to residual loss.
The goal of the principal is to minimize agency costs. Transferring resources to
monitoring and bonding is rational to the extent that this action would reduce residual loss at a
greater rate than that incurred by implementing these types of controls. If the principal invests
funds in developing, executing, and monitoring contracts with agents to minimize agency costs,
and these efforts do not reduce the residual costs then total agency costs could actually
increase (Stiglitz, 1989). For instance, excessive executive monitoring may increase residual
loss rather than reduce total agency costs by making the executive too risk averse (Tosi &
Gomez-Mejia, 1994).
Various control mechanisms may be utilized by firms to control employee behaviors and
thereby reduce agency costs. Other things equal, the "optimal contract" is characterized as one
where complete monitoring of the agent by the principal can be done, thus minimizing residual
loss as much as possible (Eisenhardt, 1985; Holstrom, 1979). This suggests a negative linear
relationship between residual loss or total agency costs and monitoring and bonding behaviors
where agency costs and residual loss would be minimized at the point where complete
monitoring could be conducted (see Exhibit 3).
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Given the fact that many employment contracts must be specified under conditions
where the agents' work behaviors cannot be easily programmed or monitored by the principal
(such as executive, management, and sales positions), the principal may rely on incentive
contracts as an alternative to supervision. In this manner, the interests of both parties coincide
so that incentives may act as a form of agent self-monitoring (Gomez-Mejia, 1994) .
For production workers the most widely used option for minimizing agency costs has been
agent monitoring rather than incentive alignment. This is normally accomplished through the
employment of supervisors, use of extensive policies and procedures (such as a probationary
period and progressive discipline), development of detailed job descriptions, and the
administration of performance appraisal (Gomez-Mejia, Balkin & Cardy, 1995).
Welbourne and Gomez-Mejia (1995) argue that this form of control may lead to a
reduction in residual loss that is greater than the increase in monitoring and bonding costs. This
occurs whenever employees conform to behaviors dictated by managers who have incomplete
information about the task. This conformity causes employees to be complacent, and they have
no incentive to search for more effective ways of performing the job. Welbourne and
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Gomez-Mejia (1995) refer to this phenomenon as "the behavioral cost of monitoring." As jobs
become more complex and interdependent, and as the supervisor lacks the technical
"know-how" to effectively monitor worker's performance or write effective job procedures,
excessive controls over employee behavior can thus result in either decreases in residual loss
that are lower than expected or even increases in residual loss if the "hidden" behavioral cost of
monitoring is sufficiently high.
In other words, employees exposed to excessive control or monitoring might not take the
initiative to find creative solutions to problems or make suggestions for more efficient means of
conducting their jobs. Due to these behavioral responses, it is possible that additional
monitoring may simply transfer agency costs from residual loss to monitoring costs or potentially
augment total agency cost. Graphically, this relationship can be depicted as a U-shaped curve:
at some point greater levels of monitoring activity will actually augment total agency costs
because in addition to increased monitoring costs, the behavioral cost of monitoring begins to
supplement residual loss (see Exhibit 4).
According to Welbourne and Gomez-Mejia (1995), gainsharing may be conceptualized
as a different form of monitoring that helps prevent the dysfunctional effects noted above.
Gainsharing attempts to minimize agency costs through reduction of both monitoring and
residual loss rather than merely transferring costs from residual loss to monitoring costs.
Through the use of a contract that has both behavioral and outcome-oriented components, the
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firm encourages employees to behave in a manner consistent with the needs of the principal.
Gainsharing reduces monitoring expenses incurred by the principal because it encourages
employees to monitor each others' performance. It also reduces residual costs, including the
behavioral cost of monitoring, because workers are encouraged to find and implement
innovative procedures within their work environment.
From this perspective, gainsharing can be viewed as an attempt to transfer a business
unit from a traditional hierarchical organizational design to one that is more similar to what Fama
and Jensen (1983) describe as existing within a formal partnership (Welbourne et al., in press).
Partnerships (such as those found in legal or accounting firms) create an environment where all
the members share the business risk and also share the wealth (gains or losses incurred by the
partnership). Gainsharing plans create an agency relationship between top management and
the members of the gainsharing unit, thus risk is spread among all members of the unit, and
gains and losses are also shared among the members of the unit. Given the contract terms of
this new agency agreement, the behavioral consequences of gainsharing should be consistent
with the behaviors found within teams and between work teams that are part of professional
partnerships.
Specifically, internal monitoring both within a work team and between work teams should
increase as a result of gainsharing implementation. Fama and Jensen (1983) discuss internal or
mutual monitoring as follows: "When agents interact to produce outputs they acquire low-cost
information about colleagues, information not directly available to higher level agents. Mutual
(internal) monitoring systems tap this information for use in the control process" (p. 310). In a
partnership, due to the fact that the members are interdependent, this "mutual monitoring"
should elicit worker behaviors that eventually lead to achievement of organizational goals and
objectives.
Therefore, gainsharing plans should be associated with lower levels of formal monitoring
(such as direct supervision; work procedures and policies) of participating employees.
Gainsharing plans transfer part of the role of monitoring from the supervisors or managers to the
employees through implementation of suggestion committees. The suggestion committees are
staffed by a group of peers whose goal is to review employee suggestions and approve those
that appear to meet the cost/benefit criteria established by the suggestion teams. Gainsharing
plans thus formally encourage employees to derive new work methods and to share their
innovative ideas with the suggestion committees (a committee of peers). The incentive
alignment system (i.e., bonuses) serve to reinforce these behaviors and induce greater mutual
monitoring.
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Following the above logic, gainsharing plans substitute a different (and less costly) form
of control for direct supervision. It is expected that within and between employee teams,
gainsharing plans encourage stronger levels of peer group pressure to enforce work norms
consistent with the business unit goals. Agents have an opportunity to acquire low-cost
information about their peers due to the fact that they work with these individuals on a regular
basis. Gainsharing thus takes advantage of this type of group process. Rather than expending
resources to create surveillance systems that attempt to track employee performance and
behaviors, the firm encourages employees to monitor each other and to use this information to
assure that each worker is attaining the goals of the work group. Internal monitoring can be
formal, through the suggestion committees, or informal, through peers.
In short, when gainsharing plans are implemented, agency costs borne by the principal
are reduced by transferring some of the monitoring activities from the principal to the agent. In
addition, peers have greater opportunities to observe each others 'performance; therefore, it
may be more difficult for agents to shirk when peer pressure rather than supervision or
extensive policy and procedure enforcement represents the sanctioned form of control. Because
mutual monitoring is a more efficient form of control, gainsharing should enhance firm
performance which benefits both owners (through greater profits) and employees (through the
bonus system).
Welbourne et al. (in press) conducted some limited empirical tests of these agency
based predictions by developing a composite scale of mutual monitoring administered to
employees of two companies that had implemented gainsharing programs. Mutual monitoring
was assessed before the gainsharing plan was introduced and three quarters after the plan had
been in effect. The results indicated that gainsharing increases mutual monitoring as the theory
predicts. Yet, there is one important qualification: This effect only occurs when the employees
involved believe that both procedural and distributive justice are present. This study suggests
that use of agency theory in combination with other behavioral perspectives (such as equity
theory) can provide a robust framework to study gainsharing issues. The study itself, however,
suffers from several limitations that would need to be addressed in future research. Three in
particular are salient. First, monitoring was self-reported. Second, the time frame under
consideration was relatively short (i.e., nine months). Third, only two companies were involved
in the study so that the firm performance implications of mutual monitoring could not be
ascertained. However, the findings of the study are encouraging and suggest that more
agency-based research on gainsharing should be conducted in the future.
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Behavioral Decision Theory
An underlying assumption of agency theory is that agents are risk averse and make
decisions to reduce their risk exposure (Fama & Jensen, 1983). A parallel literature under the
rubric of behavioral decision theory argues that agents are not uniformly risk averters but may
be risk seeking under certain conditions. From this perspective, the key factor that determines
risk seeking or aversion is the performance context facing the decision maker. Specifically,
decision makers are expected to be risk averse in the domain of gains and risk seeking in the
domain of losses (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Many studies have confirmed this relationship
both for individual managers as subjects (e.g., Crum, R., Laughhunn, D., & Payne, J. W., 1980;
& Laughhunn, D. J, Payne, J. W. & Crum, R., 1980; Fishburn & Kochenberger, 1975; Puto,
1987) and for the organization as the unit of analysis (Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1986, 1988;
Singh & Montgomery, 1987). For instance, in what became known as the Bowman's paradox,
Bowman (1980, 1982) found that firms facing lower returns took more risks than firms
experiencing higher returns. It was labeled a paradox because most organizations were
believed to be risk averse and risk averse organizations would only undertake riskier projects if
these were expected to deliver a high return. Thus his findings and that of many others (see
review by Sitkin & Pablo, 1992) confirmed behavioral theory's prediction of greater risk seeking
behavior of firms with poor returns (in the domain of losses) as compared to firms with high
returns (in the domain of gains).
In a conceptual paper, Welbourne and Gomez-M jia (1995) argue that a similar
relationship should be found in gainsharing plans. As noted earlier, most gainsharing plans
require participating employees to generate, evaluate, and implement suggestions.
Corresponding decisions vary in their level of risk (e.g., some suggestions are more costly than
others; some suggestions are associated with more uncertain outcomes than others;
implementation may require minimal or extensive changes in work design and so forth). If
performance context is an important determinant of decision risk for individuals and
organizations, it seems equally valid that differences in the performance criteria used to trigger
gainsharing bonuses may produce very different risk taking behaviors among workers. In other
words, under the identical gainsharing plan agents (workers) may be risk seeking or risk averse
depending on the nature of the performance facing them at the time. This hypothesis remains to
be tested empirically.
Concluding Comments on Theory Based Research
In summary, the theory based literature on gainsharing has engendered numerous
hypotheses concerning the variables that influence the effectiveness of these plans and
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conditions that mediate their relative success. These explanatory frameworks are
complementary rather than competing, although little is known in a comparative sense as to
which ones account for more variance in predicting gainsharing outcomes. It seems fruitful at
this point to begin integrating constructs and relationships from various paradigms to develop a
more powerful and comprehensive gainsharing model that incorporates individual,
organizational and environmental dimensions.
Clearly, there is a sore need for more gainsharing data that is grounded in theory. With
the exception of the empirical literature falling under the participative management umbrella,
much of which is methodologically weak, the remaining theoretical formulations show sparse
supporting evidence. It is also worth noting that the socio-psych logical perspectives reviewed
here attempt to predict individual behaviors in a gainsharing environment, but to date the
studies that consider the individual as the unit analysis rely almost exclusively on attitudinal
data.
DESCRIPTIVE LITERATURE
The bulk of the extensive gainsharing literature is a theoretical and exploratory in nature.
A review of these publications by Milkovich (1987) almost a decade ago led him to conclude that
"the literature is dominated by descriptions of various plans and prescriptions of how to use
them" (p. 4). A few years later, Graham-Moore and Ross (1990) note in their review book on the
subject that "gainsharing has been part of the incentive and industrial relations field for fifty
years, yet full understanding of why it works has eluded behavioral science." More recently,
Welbourne et al., (in press) came to similar conclusions by noting that most of the descriptive
literature is based on the notion that participation drives gainsharing results yet these ideas are
loosely specified, often written from an advocacy perspective that employee involvement
(through gainsharing) is conducive to greater organizational effectiveness. This is unfortunate in
light of the rich theoretical background (as summarized in Exhibit 1 and earlier discussions) that
could be brought to bear on these issues. In spite of it’s a theoretical nature, the descriptive
literature is reviewed next both because it represents the majority of the publications on
gainsharing and because it may complement some of the more rigorous research discussed
earlier. According to the categorization system that will be employed, the descriptive literature
falls into one of three classes: field studies (Exhibit 5), exploratory surveys (Exhibits 6) and
conceptual articles (Exhibit 7).
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EXHIBIT 5
Listing of Descriptive Field Studies
         DESCRIPTIVE
                         FIELD STUDIES
MULTIPLE     SINGLE
       CASE STUDIES           CASE STUDIES
   QUALITATIVE QUANTITATIVE  QUALITATIVE QUANTITATIVE
-Lesieur & Puckett (1969) -Doherty, Nord & McAdams (1989) -Chamberlain (1946) -Gray (1971)
-NCFQWL (1976) -Wallace (1990) -Davenport (1950) -Ross & Jones (1972)
-Bullock & Bullock (1982) -Hatcher, Ross & Collins (1991) -Daigenault (1952) -Schultz & McKersie (1973)
-McGrath (1994) -Dowd (1955) -Debettignies (1987)
-Schodlatz (1955) -Banker & Datar (1987)
-Martucci (1957) -Miller & Schuster (1987)
-Gilson & Lefcowitz (1957) -Hanlon, Meyer & Taylor (1991)
-Jehring (1967) -Flannery & Williams (1990)
-Moore (1976) -Gowen & Jennings (1990)
-Cummings & Molloy (1977) -Masternak (1991- 992)
-Schulhof (1979) -Masternak & Ross (1992)
-Ramquist (1982) -Masternak (1993)
-Hatcher & Ross (1986)
-Yarbrough (1987)
-Hauck & Ross (1987)
-Magnus (1987)
-Jewell & Jewell (1987)
-Ross & Collins (1987)
-Hatcher, Ross & Ross (1987)
-Ross, Hatcher & Ross (1987)
-Owens (1988)
-Davidson (1988)
-Naff & Pomedeau (1988) -Hauck & Ross (1988)
-Ewing (1989) -Finney (1989)
-Gilbert & Nelson (1989) -Anonymous (1989)
-Woos (1989) -Florkowskl (1990)
-Owens (1991) -Peck (1991a,b)
-Kissler (1992)
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EXHIBIT 6
Listing of Exploratory Surveys Literature
-Goodman, Wakeley & Ruh (1972)
-White (1979)
-US GAO Study (1981)
-Hauck (1986)
-Freud & Epstein (1984)
-Hauck (1986)
-US GAO (1986)
-Hatcher & Ross (1986)
-Voos (1987)
-O'Dell & McAdams (1987)
-Lawler, Ledford & Mohrman (1989)
-Long (1989)
-Ost (1990)
-Nickel (1990)
-Kaufman (1992)
-Markham, Scott & Little (1992)
-Lawler & Cohen (1992)
-Alexander Consulting Group (1992)
-Wyatt Data Services (1995)
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EXHIBIT 7
Listing of Conceptual Gainsharing Publications
CONCEPTUAL
LITERATURE
GENERAL   LITERATURE
 REVIEWS
-Schultz (1961) -Moore (1982)
-Krulee (1966) -Schuster (1983)
-Whyte (1966) -Milkovich (1987)
-Strauss & Sayles (1967) -Bullock & Tubbs (1990)
-Lesleur (1958) -Lawler (1988)
-Lesleur (1969) -Welbourne &
-McGregor (1980) -Gomez-Mejia (1988)
-Doyle (1970) -Gowen (1990)
-Smith & Gude (1971) -Beck 1 9
-Lane (1976/78)
-Daly (1976)
-Hackman & Suttle (1977)
-Cummlngs & Molloy (1977)
-Frost (1978)
-NCQWL 1978)
-Driscoll 1978)
-O'Dell (1981)
-Lawler (1981)
-Doyle (1982)
-Greham-Moore & Ross (1983)
-Ross (1983)
-Doyle (1983)
-Hatcher & Ross (1983)
-Ross & Hauck (1983)
-Ross & Ross (1984)
-Metzger (1986)
-Lawler (1986)
-Dar-El (1988)
-Florkowski & Lifton (1987)
-Miller & Schuster (1987)
-Hauck (1987)
-Schuster & Miller (1987)
-Dulworth & Usllaner (1987)
-Ross, Hatcher & Ross (1987)
-Thor (1987) -Hammerstone (1987)
-Owens (1988) -Markham & Scott (1988)
-Peterson & Tracy (1988)-Thomas & Olson (1988)
-Scott (1988) -Musselwhite (1988)
-Gross & Backer -Milkovich & Milkovich (1992)
-Ewing (1989) -Nichols (1989)
-Nickel & O'Neal (1990) -Graham-Moore & Ross (1990)
-Lawler (1990) -Paulson (1991)
-DeBettignies (1991) -Rock & Berger (1991)
-Milkovich & Milkovich (1992)
-Imberman (1992) -Bailey(1993)
-Milkovich (1993) -Masternak (1993-1994)
Gainsharing                                                                                                                                                                WP 95-10
Page 33
The conceptual category (see Exhibit 7) consists of eight literature reviews, and 60
general articles that introduce the reader to the concept of gainsharing. The majority of these
articles are geared for the practitioner and provide a brief overview of the concept of
gainsharing, where and when it is applicable, and how to install such a plan. Most of them
stress the beneficial aspects of gainsharing (such as positive employee relations, improved
quality, enhanced cooperation, and better communications) and seem to be written by authors
(often consultants) who are advocates of gainsharing. In addition, this literature provides
technical information concerning gainsharing formulas and other specific details on how these
plans have been administered and implemented. These publications will not be discussed here
due to their general nature and limited space; however, they are listed as a source of reference
in Exhibit 5.
Descriptive publications encompassing field studies (Exhibit 5) and exploratory surveys
(Exhibit 6) are discussed in the next two sections.
Descriptive field studies - multiple cases
A total of seven gainsharing studies are included in this category. Three of these are
qualitative or narrative in nature and four report some type of numeric indicators (see left hand
side of Exhibit 5).
Qualitative studies
The earliest qualitative study using multiple cases was published by Lesieur and Puckett
(1969) who examined Scanlon plans that were installed at Atwood Vacuum Machine Company,
Parker Pen Company, and Pfaudler. They listed the conditions under which the plans were
implemented and included general comments on some of the realized results, which included
positive employee relations, improved quality, enhanced cooperation, and better
communications.
The National Center for Quality in Working Life or NCFQWL (1976) published an
extensive report that included detailed information on the Scanlon plans installed at both Dana
Corporation and Parker Pen. The NCFQWL also included comments on the work climate prior
to installing gainsharing, the types of problems that led to a search for an alternative rewards
program, and the results of the plan. Both firms report positive outcomes including enhanced
union-management relations, bonus payments, suggestions, increased production, and
employee acceptance of new technology.
The last paper in this category, by Bullock and Bullock (1982), describes gainsharing
plans at two anonymous firms, Company A (a small steel fabrication plant) and Company B (a
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furniture manufacturer). Both programs were considered successful with improved employee
attitudes, better firm performance, suggestions, and increased levels of trust in management.
Quantitative Studies
A total of four publications using multiple cases fall into this category. Doherty, Nord, and
McAdams (1989) reviewed corporate records at four firms using organizational change
interventions, where gainsharing was one of the methods used. The results indicate that
gainsharing led to improved productivity and quality, lower costs, improved safety, better
attendance, and an enhanced awareness of the corporations' goals. They concluded that
gainsharing and organization development complement each other.
Wallace (1990) published the results of a three year study focusing on alternative pay
systems where he researched a total of 46 organizations to understand their experiences with a
variety of reward systems including gainsharing. He found that approximately 46 % of the firms
sampled relied on some form of gainsharing and that gainsharing and skill-based pay were the
most commonly used alternative reward plans. Frequently the gainsharing formulas were being
tailored to fit a firm's strategy rather than adhering to the old Scanlon plan procedures. For
example, the formula used often included a variety of criteria not traditionally considered to be
components of bonus calculations (e.g., customer service, quality). In addition, gainsharing
plans were being extended to include non-pr duction employees, and they were being
implemented in industries that had previously been unfamiliar with these programs (i.e., health
care, financial institutions, and retailing). In summary, Wallace found an increased interest in
gainsharing, creative approaches toward implementation of these plans, and favorable
responses from firms that had instituted the programs.
Hatcher, Ross, and Collins (1991) interviewed 149 supervisors and non-management
employees in five gainsharing companies. The data was codified by inductively classifying
comments into categories. The authors report that: (a) affective organizational commitment and
trust are important prerequisites for the gainsharing plan to succeed; (b) specific mechanisms to
provide recognition for the individual employees who get involved should be in place; and (c)
employees take into account whether or not management is acting in good faith before being
committed to the plan.
The last article in this category, by McGrath (1994), provides an overview of the
gainsharing programs at Huron Automatic Screw Company, Milan Screw Products Company,
and EPCO Products. All three of these programs heavily emphasized employee participation.
According to McGrath, based on his unstructured interviews with managers and employees,
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gainsharing in these firms led to greater "teamwork, efficiency, quality, employee satisfaction,
and company profits . . . and lower turnover rates and costs" (p. 446) .
Descriptive Field Studies - Single Cases
A total of 45 cases describe the experiences of a single firm that implemented
gainsharing. Thirty three of these cases use a narrative approach, while 12 rely on some type of
quantitative measure (see right hand side of Exhibit 5). The qualitative and quantitative single
case studies are discussed in turn.
Qualitative Studies
The 33 case studies falling under this category are listed in Exhibit 8, with the author,
firm name, and a brief summary of the gainsharing plan results. As can be seen by browsing
Exhibit 8, reported results are predominantly positive. Although most of these publications
involve manufacturing firms, there are examples of other industries such as restaurants and
hospitals (Jewell & Jewell, 1987; Davidson, 1988; Finney, 1989) and government operations
(Naff & Pomerleau, 1988; Gilbert & Nelson, 1989). The earliest case study reported was
published in Life magazine by Chamberlain (1946) detailing the experience of Adamson
Company; this article is later cited by management and union officials at LaPointe Machine Tool
Company as the impetus for their considering gainsharing. LaPointe was the subject of several
later case studies (Davenport, 1950; Daigneault, 1952; Dowd, 1955). As can be seen in Exhibit
8, most of the earlier reported cases were Scanlon plans, while the later cases tended to be
customized gainsharing programs, most of which were tailored after the Scanlon Plan and
include the involvement system (e.g., Owens, 1991; Peck, 1991a,b). Schodlatz (1955) published
information on the Rucker Plan with results similar to those obtained by Scanlon plans, including
increased profits and bonuses averaging 13.5 % .
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EXHIBIT 8
QUALITATIVE LITERATURE - SINGLE CASE STUDIES
SP = Scanlon plan CGS = Customized gainsharing plan
Author Company Name Results
Chamberlain (1946) Adamson Co. SP - Positive
Davenport (1950)
Daigenault (1952)
Dowd (1955)
LaPointe Machine
Tool Co.
SP - Positive
Schodlatz (1955) Reznor Mgt. Co. Rucker plan
Positive
Martucci (1957) Pfaudler Co. SP - Positive
Gilson & Lefcowitz (1957) New Jersey Ceramics Co. SP - Unsuccessful
Jehring (1967) Mgt. Co. - Household
Fixtures
SP - Positive
Moore (1976)
Cummings & Molloy
(1977)
Desoto, Inc. SP - Positive
Ewing (1977) Donnelly Mirros, Inc. SP - Positive
Schulhof (1979) Rocky Mtn. Data Systems SP - Positive
Ramquist (1982) Herman Miller SP - Positive
Hatcher & Ross (1986) Peabody Galion (mfg. firm) CGS - Positive
Yarbrough (1987) American Valve & Hydrant
Co.
SP - Positive
Hauck & Ross (1987)
Hauck & Ross (1988)
Volvo CGS - Positive
Magnus (1987) Vulvan Materials Co.
(construction)
CGS - Positive
Jewell & Jewell (1987) Restaurant CGS - Positive
Ross & Collins (1987) Tech Forms
Industries
CGS - Positive
Hatcher, Ross & Ross
(1987)
Dana Spicer CGS - Positive
Owens (1988) Mosier Industries CGS - Positive
Davidson (1988) Southern Co. Services CGS - No results reported
Naff & Pomerleau (1988) Office of Federal
Investigations
CGS - Mixed
Finney (1989) Hospital CGS - Positive
Gilbert & Nelson (1989) McClellan Air Force Base CGS - No results
Anonymous (1989) Huffy Corporation CGS - Positive
Woods (1989) Naval Aviation CGS - Some Positive
Ross, Hatcher & Ross
(1989)
Tech Form Industries CGS - Positive
Florkowski (1990) Unionized co. in auto
industry
"What if" discussion, no
results
Owens (1991) Mosier Industries CGS - Positive
Peck (1991a,b) Lower Valley Power &
Light
CGS - Positive
Kissler (1992) Manufacturing facility CGS - Positive
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Many of the earlier Scanlon plans were installed in an effort to find a substitute for
piece-rate systems that were not living up to expectations (Dowd, 1955; Schodlatz, 1955;
Ramquist, 1982; Ross, Hatcher & Ross, 1987). These employers found that their piece-rate
systems resulted in a variety of problems including: poor quality, work group problems
associated with "rate busters", fears that employees would lose their jobs if they excel the
standard, sophisticated responses by employees designed to "beat the system" when time
studies were being conducted, high maintenance costs associated with administration of the
plans, and generally poor labor relations climates. In contrast, gainsharing plans were believed
to increase profits (Chamberlain, 1946; Jehring, 1967; Schulhof, 1979; Moore, 1976; Yarbrough,
1987), enhance labor management relations (Daigenault, 1952; Dowd,1955), improve quality
(Ramquist, 1982; Hatcher, Ross & Ross, 1987) and reduce turnover rates (Hauck & Ross,
1987; Yarbrough, 1987).
The only two articles that reported negative results tended to cushion the findings by
advancing reasons why the plans had less than optimal outcomes. Gilson and Lefcowitz (1957)
blamed poor results on the nature of the work force, characterizing employees as housewives
who did not wish to participate on the job; they also noted defects in the general operation of the
Scanlon plan as reasons for the lack of success. Naff and Pomerleau (1988) also reported an
unsuccessful plan that was installed in the Office of Federal Investigations Division in San
Francisco. Although it was labeled as gainsharing, it was administered in a fashion very similar
to that used in a piece-rate system; therefore, it did not encompass many of the expected
characteristics of gainsharing.
In summary, this literature primarily reports the positive results accruing to individual
firms that installed gainsharing. These publications lack substantial data or statistical analysis.
Interviews with the CEO, managers, employees, and union representatives are common and
tend to be portrayed in narrative form. These qualitative studies provide impressionistic
information on the types of environments most favorable to gainsharing and outcomes that
might be expected given certain program characteristics. However, results are difficult to
compare and generalize because of their firm specificity and lack of sufficient detail.
Quantitative Studies
A total of 12 single case studies used empirical measures to depict gainsharing results
(see last column of Exhibit 5). These studies tend to be very similar to the qualitative single case
studies in terms of their goal, which is providing descriptive information about a particular firm's
experience with gainsharing.
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Gray (1971) reported the results of an unsuccessful attempt to install gainsharing at the
Linwood plant of Pressed Steel Company. Data reported include numbers of suggestions
between 1963 and 1964, departmental analysis of suggestions, absenteeism, overtime, lost
time, and strike information. This study is one of a few that have failed to show positive
gainsharing outcomes. This was primarily blamed on poor implementation.
Ross and Jones (1972) reviewed employee responses to a complex gainsharing formula
at a anonymous firm to examine whether employee knowledge of the bonus computation was
related to length of service, suggestions submitted, and number of times elected to a committee.
The results indicated that length of service and knowledge were correlated (.416); in addition,
significant correlations were found between knowledge and number of suggestions submitted
(.238), number of times elected to a committee (.347), and hierarchical level in the organization
(.384).
Schultz and McKersie (1973) studied an oil company to determine if gainsharing might
be feasible at three work sites. The study involved collection of interview and archival data to
determine how the system might work; the article then lists suggestions regarding the conditions
under which gainsharing might be successful.
DeBettignies (1987) conducted a study of communication patterns within a firm that had
implemented gainsharing. The data that resulted from studying 131 employees' attitudes toward
communication patterns indicated significant positive changes in attitudes toward lateral
communication, but no changes in upward or downward communication patterns were
discovered.
Banker and Datar (1987) conducted a field study at a division of a Fortune 500 company
and found that accounting problems existed in their gainsharing formula. Their analysis, which
included extensive interviews with managers and reviews of corporate records, indicated a
better measurement for labor productivity might be useful. They proceed to detail the new
measurement system, when and why it might be more appropriate, and the advantages
associated with its use.
Miller and Schuster (1987) employed an interrupted time series design with data that
spanned over a nine year period of time to determine the results of gainsharing installation at a
large, manufacturing firm. They found moderate and consistent productivity improvement and
bonus payment in addition to a total of 5,000 suggestions being submitted during that period of
time.
Gowen and Jennings (1990) examined productivity changes of 179 employees of a
unionized manufacturing plant that implemented gainsharing. Because the plan was changed
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from non-participative to participative during the study, the authors were able to compare in a
longitudinal fashion productivity figures under both conditions. Gowen and Jennings (1990: 162)
concluded that "[the] study demonstrates the highly significant improvement in employee
productivity and scrap rate cost savings in a gainsharing program which was changed from a
non-participative to a participative plan."
Flannery and Williams (1990:61) describe the positive results accrued by the University
of Alabama Hospital in Birmingham after implementing a customized form of gainsharing.
According to the author "patients are happier, productivity has improved, and the hospital has
increased its margin by fourfold in the first year alone. The second year financial results are
eight times better than they were at the start of the program. "
Masternak (1993) and Masternak and Ross (1992) examined the results of gainsharing
programs introduced at BF Goodrich and two facilities of a chemical firm in Austin and Dallas. In
all cases the authors found dramatic improvements in quality, costs, and employee attitudes.
The authors attribute gainsharing success to greater employee involvement, open
communications, and perceived fairness of the gainsharing formula used.
More recently, Hanlon, Meyer and Taylor (1994) studied a gainsharing program in a
large package delivery firm. A unique twist to this study is that at some point during the plan the
bonuses were eliminated yet the participation mechanisms remained. The authors report large
attitudinal improvements as a result of gainsharing. Three months after the bonus was
eliminated, attitudinal measures remained positive. Hanlon et al (1994: 107) draw the following
policy implications from their study: "In light of this research it may indeed be appropriate to
eliminate the group bonus at a mutually agreed upon point. Managers do not have to be so
concerned with designing a bonus formula that will generate infinite savings, gains/bonuses,
which would seem to be a formidable goal."
The single case studies provide a considerable amount of information regarding the
results of specific gainsharing programs; the data indicates that interest in gainsharing is on the
rise and many organizational benefits are associated with it. The conclusions from these studies
are similar to those derived by reviewing the qualitative studies - that gainsharing can be
successfully implemented in a wide variety of settings.
Unfortunately, the case study literature is not balanced in term of reporting both
successful and unsuccessful attempts at gainsharing; it is not clear whether gainsharing plans
are actually successful in the majority of cases or if unsuccessful cases are simply not
published. Most firms retain the right to the publication of sensitive materials; gainsharing results
are not likely to be divulged unless management believes it can reap a public relations benefit
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by doing so (i.e., by portraying a predominately successful story). An objective, critical analysis
is almost totally absent from this literature so it is difficult to ascertain those factors that mediate
the relative effectiveness of these programs.
Surveys
We identified a total of 19 exploratory surveys in the gainsharing literature (see Exhibit
6). There is no doubt that additional surveys have been and are being conducted by private
consulting firms or other organizations. Although most surveys may never be published, this
representative group of studies should sufficiently cover this domain.
The majority of surveys report the frequency of gainsharing use. In addition, many
publications include data regarding the reasons such plans are introduced and information
describing the results of gainsharing implementation. Often the authors design questionnaires
that are not focused primarily on gainsharing, but gainsharing data are embedded in inquiries
regarding such topics as involvement programs (Lawler, Ledford & Mohrman, 1989), workplace
innovations (Long, 1989), union-management cooperation methods (Voos, 1987), and incentive
programs (Nickel, 1990; Lawler & Cohen, 1992). In addition to the studies that aim to uncover
the frequency of gainsharing use and the results of such programs, four surveys focus on more
specific research questions. These two sets of studies are discussed in turn.
Frequency and results oriented surveys.
In one of the earliest studies, Goodman, Wakeley & Ruh (1972) conducted a survey of
21 Scanlon plan sites, giving questionnaires to a total of 2,636 employees. Goodman et al. were
interested in employee evaluations of gainsharing and found that as a whole employees'
reactions were rather positive. The United States General Accounting Office (USGAO)
published two studies on gainsharing (1981,1986). The first study (1981) conducted a survey of
38 firms (names of organizations were obtained from consultants) with gainsharing plans (17
had Scanlon plans, 8 Rucker, 11 Improshare, and 2 other) and uncovered very favorable
outcomes, including improved labor-management relations (reported by 80.6% of the
organizations), reduced number of grievances (47.2%), and less absenteeism and turnover
(36.1 % ). The later study (1986) focused on efforts made by the Department of Defense to
implement gainsharing; USGAO conducted extensive interviews and reviewed documents in 16
installations that had introduced gainsharing. The study indicated that all gainsharing plans
resulted in cost savings (ranging from $7,000 to $1 million); some locations also reported
decreases in sick time and overtime. Freund and Epstein (1984) published the results of a New
York Stock Exchange survey covering 49,000 corporations with 100 or more employees. Their
study was designed to discover the frequency in use of innovative human resource
Gainsharing                                                                                                                                                                WP 95-10
Page 41
management systems. They found that 15 % of approximately 7,000 firms with 500 or more
employees had some form of gainsharing; of those, 61 % to 77 % said that gainsharing resulted
in improved firm performance. Their definitions of gainsharing, however, included profit sharing
as a form of gainsharing.
Voos (1987) sent questionnaires to 379 managers in Wisconsin firms and requested
data pertaining to labor relations programs implemented by these organizations. It was found
that 62 had installed either gainsharing or profit sharing plans, and 18 of these had discontinued
such systems. Additional details regarding the managers perceptions of these plans are
included in the summary statistics.
O'Dell and McAdams (1987) conducted a survey of the members of the American
Productivity Center and the American Compensation Association to determine the frequency
with which a variety of human resource management systems, including gainsharing, were
used. They concluded that the results indicated a growth in "non-traditional" reward systems. A
total of 211 firms (13%) had installed gainsharing (their definition does not include profit sharing
as a form of gainsharing). Their data led them to state that "gainsharing plans are the fastest
growing of all the non-traditional pay-for-performance plans" (p. 34), and they also noted that
this trend was expected to continue.
Lawler, Ledford & Mohrman (1989) accessed a sub-sample of a 1987 USGAO job
involvement strategies surveys and concluded from their report that merit pay continues to be
the dominant method of paying for performance within the United States. They also noted that
26 % of the sample had some form of gainsharing, but in most instances only a small
percentage of the workforce was covered under such system. A follow up survey by Lawler and
Cohen (1992) reported a large increase in the use of gainsharing, with 39% of Fortune 100 firms
relying on some form of gainsharing program.
Long (1989) conducted a study of Canadian firms using workplace innovations; the
questionnaires were sent to 5,000 organizations. The results indicated that 9.7% of these
businesses used some form of gainsharing, while approximately 25 % had profit sharing plans
installed. They also noted that 70% of the gainsharing plans had been introduced in the past six
years.
Ost (1990) surveyed 102 U.S. firms by telephone and mail regarding the types of pay for
performance plans that were in use. A total of 30 out of 102 firms (29 %) had some form of
gainsharing, and four additional organizations indicated they planned to add gainsharing.
Nickel (1990) published the results of a Towers Perrin study that surveyed Fortune 100 and
smaller firms in Fall of 1989. A sample of 212 firms responded to a follow-up survey focusing on
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group incentives; the results indicated that 33 % had gainsharing plans while 37 % had profit
sharing; a total of 30 % of the firms had some blended form of profit sharing and gainsharing.
Markham, Scott and Little (1992) surveyed 10,000 human resources professionals from the
Society for Human Resource Management (SHRM). Based on a response of 1,639 members,
Markham et al. found that gainsharing is found in all industrial sectors but it is clearly more
common in manufacturing. Their data indicates that customized plans are far more popular than
all of the traditional "off the shelf" programs combined (i.e., Scanlon, Improshare, and Rucker).
A similar survey of SHRM members by the Alexander Consulting Group (1992) found that
gainsharing was perceived as a critical issue this decade, outranking other contemporary issues
such as work force diversity and corporate culture.
A more focused gainsharing survey consisting of Improshare users by Kaufman (1992)
report that the median productivity increase was about 8% in the first year, and the cumulative
productivity gains had risen to 17.5 % by the 3rd year. After the 3rd year productivity gains
begin to level off. Respondents indicate that most of the gains reflect reductions in downtime
and defect rates. An interesting aspect of this survey is that significant improvements are
attributed to gainsharing even though employee participation plays a relatively minor role in the
population surveyed (i.e., Improshare users).
Lastly, the Wyatt Data Services (1995) reports that 11.6% of firms use gainsharing for
technical and skilled trades. Gainsharing effectiveness for these groups was rated higher than
the effectiveness of annual bonuses, spot awards, small group incentives, profit sharing, and
individual incentives.
In summary, the surveys reviewed above all seem to be indicative that gainsharing is a
popular reward system and that its use is on the rise. Consistent with the case studies reviewed
earlier, results are generally very positive as reported by survey participants. The same caveats
apply here, however, in that companies with failing or disappointing gainsharing programs may
be less likely to complete the survey. Unfortunately we don't know to what extent this response
bias may distort the survey results. In addition, interpretation of much of this data remains an
open question. For instance, Goodman et al. (1972) attribute their positive findings to greater
employee participation under Scanlon. Kaufman (1992), on the other hand, attributes his
positive findings to the bonus system under Improshare and appears to de-emphasize the role
of employee participation.
Focused surveys
White (1979) surveyed a total of 23 companies to gather data with the intention of
determining the types of factors that led to gainsharing plan success, where success was
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specifically defined as plan retention. White concluded that plan retention was related to
attitudes toward participative decision making, number of years the plan was in place, the
expected level of success, and the attitudes of the CEO and top management team.
Hauck (1981) conducted a survey that focused on comparing the formulas used in the
Scanlon, Rucker, and Improshare systems. Executives at two hospitals and seven banks were
surveyed to determine if industry-type was a determinant of formula appropriateness. The
results indicated that industry was not as important as labor intensity, and it was noted that labor
intensive firms preferred a Scanlon-type formula. This is not surprising since Scanlon plans are
designed to reduce labor costs. In a subsequent study, Hauck (1986) sent out a survey inquiring
whether hospitals or banks preferred the single or multi-cost ratios; the results seemed to
indicate that industry again was not a determinant of formula preference.
Hatcher and Ross (1986) surveyed managers at firms with gainsharing plans to
determine the perceived level of influence managers exercised while working in a gainsharing
environment. Their survey indicated that managers perceived they had a considerable amount
of influence while gainsharing was in operation. For example, 75 % indicated their ability to "get
the job done" was good or very good after gainsharing compared to only 64 % prior to
gainsharing.
In summary, these four studies are also favorably predisposed toward gainsharing. In
addition to the caveats discussed above concerning other surveys, a potential problem here is
that if asked people are more likely to attribute failure to external factors and success to internal
factors. There is also a strong cultural bias against mentioning money as an important issue
even when deep down it is often foremost in people's minds (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992a).
Thus one needs to be somewhat skeptical of self-reports indicating why gainsharing works or
doesn't work and expressed preferences by individuals completing the survey.
RESEARCH AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE
Throughout the article we have identified methodological or conceptual weaknesses in
the gainsharing literature that should be addressed in future research. Two issues in particular
stand out. First, there is a dire need for more theory based studies. Gainsharing as an area of
research is no longer at an exploratory stage. As we saw earlier, hundreds of studies have been
conducted on gainsharing yet only a handful of these test formal propositions derived from a
conceptual framework. Many such hypotheses, as summarized in Exhibit 1, are readily available
to guide future empirical work. Second, new methodologies are required that provide for a
stronger test of causation. Reliance on self-report indicators where all measures are obtained
from the same respondent should be especially discouraged. Use of multiple sources of data for
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independent and dependent variables (e.g., managers, employees, customers, personnel files)
would tend to mitigate artifactual results prompted by social desirability, attribution biases, and
common method variance (all of which plague much of the empirical work on gainsharing).
Whenever possible, longitudinal rather than cross-sectional studies should be conducted.
This last section of the manuscript raises specific research questions on gainsharing that
provide interesting leads for future studies.
Linking aggregate, team, and individual rewards
One of the criticisms of gainsharing programs is that they are prone to free-riding
because the performance criteria used to distribute rewards encompasses collective
contributions but not individual inputs. In a highly individualistic culture such as that of the U.S.
this form of aggregate incentive is likely to be demotivating and perhaps lead to opportunistic
behaviors (e.g., shirking) because a person's relative contribution is neglected in the bonus
allocation (Gomez-Mejia & Welbourne, 1991). It is possible, however, that this problem may be
minimized under certain conditions. First, as noted in the introduction, a growing number of
firms are differentially allocating the gainsharing proceeds (which are generated via an
aggregate performance formula) to teams and individuals based on relative contributions to the
"common good." Second, many firms utilize multiple layers of rewards simultaneously so that
the disadvantages of one plan may be neutralized by the advantages of another. For instance,
merit pay and key contributor bonuses recognize individual contributions, yet engender
competition. Gainsharing, if used alongside these programs, can promote cooperation even
though it may not increase individual motivation.
Research that focuses on how the organizational advantages of gainsharing may be
accrued while at the same time recognizing individual contributions is almost nil. This is
important for obvious practical reasons because ultimately the success of any gainsharing
program depends on employees' willingness to make a personal commitment to it. This is also
important from a theoretical perspective. For instance, one can envision a conceptual
framework to study this issue that links individual based motivation models (such as expectancy
theory) with group based models (such as participative management) and organizational level
models (such as contingency theory) .
Gainsharing as a control mechanism
Some have suggested that gainsharing reduces the need for hierarchical organizational
structures because it creates an incentive alignment system that in effect substitutes direct
monitoring by supervisors with mutual monitoring by peers (Kandel & Lazear, 1992; Welbourne
et al., in press). In other words, by linking rewards to common interests, agents have a stake in
Gainsharing                                                                                                                                                                WP 95-10
Page 45
the contributions of their peers and as a consequence engage in monitoring those with whom
they are cooperatively linked. This means that the individuals involved play a dual role: They act
as principals in monitoring others, but also serve in the role of agent to the same people they
are monitoring.
Unfortunately, we know little as to how much mutual monitoring actually occurs under
gainsharing plans. Future research can benefit by behaviorally measuring mutual monitoring
patterns, the effect this has on supervisors, and how group dynamics may engender or thwart
the intensity and direction of such monitoring. For instance, it is conceivable that a negatively
perceived gainsharing program may increase mutual monitoring in a manner prejudicial to the
organization (e.g., holding back more efficient ways to perform the job if participants are afraid
of layoffs). We also know little as to how much of the observed mutual monitoring, if any, is
attributed to a greater social awareness of each other (committee participation) or to the
potential magnitude of the bonus (incentive alignment).
Gainsharing as an instrument of change
A number of firms implement gainsharing in an effort to modify or redirect the
organization's culture (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992a). A common objective is to use
gainsharing to create a shared sense of corporate mission and to rally workers behind this
mission., through greater employee involvement and aggregate performance contingent
bonuses. It is often believed that gainsharing can move an organization from a climate of
distrust, adversarial relations, and internal conflict to one that is more open, supportive, and
cohesive.
Little is known, however, as to how gainsharing may be successfully used as a change
agent and the conditions that lead to favorable results. In particular, from a contingency
perspective, it is important to understand how other elements of the system may need to
change concurrently for gainsharing to be effective (e.g., work design, organizational
structures). It is also possible that some specific forms of gainsharing may be better change
agents under some conditions than others. For example, an Improshare type program may be
more appropriate for a situation with a poor labor relations climate because it demands less
employee involvement. Alternatively, it could be argued that a Scanlon type plan that requires
extensive employee participation may offer the greatest benefits for firms that have a
dysfunctional conflict ridden culture because it forces people to discuss and solve their
differences in the open instead of letting these problems fester behind closed doors.
In short, while many case studies have examined factors associated with gainsharing
success, more theoretical and empirical work is necessary to learn the conditions under which
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these plans may be effectively implemented as change agents, and how specific elements of
these plans (e.g., degree of participation) are more or less suitable to these varying conditions.
Understanding failures
As noted earlier, almost all gainsharing case studies are successful stories or tend to
gloss over potential problem areas. A practical reason for this is that management is not likely to
open the door to investigators to interview workers and publish potentially embarrassing
information, particularly if a labor union is involved. Thus, only positive gainsharing results tend
to see the light of day. Yet, by some estimates up to two-thirds of gainsharing plans do not meet
expectations (Imberman, 1993). There is far more to learn if future case studies were to focus
on failure, rather than favorable situations. This would bring greater balance to the present
gainsharing literature that takes a strong advocacy role. On the flipped side, it can also offer
more insights as to why gainsharing succeeds. Some of these failed attempts are well known
(such as the case of Dupont in the early 1990's) yet very little systematic investigation and
analysis of these situations can be found anywhere. Admittedly this is going to be a difficult task
given managerial reluctance to open up, but there may be ways to circumvent this fear (such as
guaranteeing anonymity to a given company while providing it with access to information from
other firms that are also kept anonymous). One way to start would be to identify those firms
which have dropped their gainsharing programs in the recent past and target these for in-depth
examination.
Gainsharing as a strategic tool
Much has been said in recent years about the need to design compensation systems to
support corporate and business unit strategies (see Gerhart and Milkovich, 1993 for a review of
this literature). The bulk of the empirical research on these issues is concentrated on top
management pay and general characteristics of the reward system for exempt employees (e.g.,
emphasis on variable versus fixed pay, degree of centralization in pay decisions). To the
authors' knowledge none of the empirical studies have examined how the strategic objectives of
the firm link with gainsharing, and their joint effect on firm performance.
There is ample reason to suspect that these relationships are important as noted by
GomezMejia and Balkin (1992a) using Miles and Snow's (1978) strategy typology. Firms
pursuing a prospector or growth strategy may need to proceed cautiously when introducing
gainsharing programs because bonuses are tied to productivity increases above base
productivity measures. A stable history will help assure a fair bonus distribution and make the
calculation of the bonus better understood by employees. Unstable or scanty data based on
historical records will make it difficult to establish reliable future performance standards. If the
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firm is constantly changing the bonus calculations, confidence in the system is likely to suffer.
By the same token, prospectors and growth firms need a greater degree of flexibility.
Gainsharing may contribute to firm performance by increasing the proportion of variable pay
allowing the company to better respond to environmental jolts.
Risk and behavioral response to gainsharing
All gainsharing programs involve some degree of economic risk to employees because
the bonus is uncertain. Few firms actually reduce salary or merit raises when the aggregate
performance outcomes fall below a certain level. Most, however, infuse risk by making it difficult
to reach performance goals and/or by allocating fewer resources to increases in fixed income
(e.g., merit pay which becomes part of base salary) in exchange for offering employees the
potential to earn a higher reward (i.e., a bonus). Employees respond to perceived risk in future
unsecured income by being more or less conservative in work related decisions that they
believe affect that future income. The key decision employees exert some control on in a
gainsharing program concerns the generation and assessment of suggestions. These
suggestions may vary in the amount of risk involved. For instance, the resources required to
implement the suggestion, the technological and work flow changes associated with the
suggestion, uncertainty in mean- nd relationships and the like all affect the relative risk of
decisions made under the auspices of the gainsharing program.
Little is known about the factors that influence the degree to which gainsharing
participants are risk averse or risk seeking. This is an important issue because too much risk
aversity may mean that good ideas or innovations with the potential for high productivity returns
or significant savings are discouraged. On the other hand, too much risk seeking may induce
embracing suggestions with a low probability of success and a high cost of failure.
Future research can focus on this issue from several angles. First, the type of
performance measure used by the gainsharing plan may play an important role in the risk
posture adopted by employees. The risk literature suggests that decision makers are risk averse
to the point of selecting less desirable options when faced with situations where they exercise
very limited influence on outcomes (MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 1986; 1990). Gainsharing
programs utilize a variety of formulas with varying levels of employee control over the outcomes
or criteria used to trigger the award. The greatest degree of control is afforded by plans which
rely on productivity measures because workers can influence efficiency and cost structure. The
lowest degree of control exists in gainsharing plans where bonuses are linked to broader criteria
of firm performance such as profitability or market value because these are more sensitive to
external events that may have little to do with how efficiently a firm is run.
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Second, it is possible that the relationship between risk shifting to employees (e.g., if a
high proportion of take home pay is in the form of a non-recurrent bonus), and the benefits
derived from gainsharing is curvilinear (Welbourne & Gomez-Mejia, 1995). That is, up to a
certain point collective risk is beneficial to the organization because of greater consonance of
interest between employees and the firm and the incentive to engage in mutual monitoring. After
a certain point, however, too much risk sharing in a group incentive program is likely to be
dysfunctional. For instance, increased productivity or efficiency may be perceived as detrimental
to job security as more risk is shifted to employees. It is possible that employees will rebel by
using mutual monitoring to increase job security as much as possible within their own work
teams. Such a situation has been well documented with piece-rate systems whenever workers
felt these threatened their jobs (Gomez-M jia & Balkin, 19928).
Third, prospect theory would predict that the performance context facing the firm may
influence the employee's risk aversity in a gainsharing program. Individuals facing a loss context
tend to be more risk seeking than those facing a gain context (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
This suggests that to the extent a gainsharing program is introduced "to turn things around" (a
loss context) it would trigger a risk seeking response. Conversely, if a gainsharing program is
implemented to "make a good situation better" (a gain context), then it is more likely to evoke a
risk averse response.
Fourth, the more collective risks are shifted to employees under a group incentive
program, the more salient the perceived fairness of the program becomes to the risk posture
adopted by employees. By definition making riskier decisions involves a greater possibility of
loss. The perceived negative consequences of failure and associated insecurities augment
when fairness is low. This induces the group to become more cautious in decision making for
fear of retaliation, whether real or imagined. At the opposite end, positive justice perceptions
allow individuals to see risk more as an opportunity than a threat, and therefore this increases
their willingness to trade off risk against potential high returns where the benefits of alternative
options increase with their risk. In other words, lack of perceived fairness increases the
perception of loss, the significance of those losses, and the uncertainty associated with those
losses. Therefore, this condition fuels the insecurity of workers (e.g., fear that greater cost
savings will lead to layoffs), which in turn triggers a self-prot ction reaction leading to increases
risk aversion.
In summary, risk represents a key construct that may affect the effectiveness of
gainsharing and that can enhance our behavioral understanding of how employees respond to
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these programs. The literature on risk is extensive (see review by Yates, 1992) and can provide
a solid foundation for future research on these issues.
Multidimensional reward criteria
The traditional gainsharing programs described earlier (Scanlon, Rucker, & Improshare)
use efficiency as the criterion to calculate the bonus pool. Efficiency is generally assessed in
terms of labor or material cost savings relative to a historical base. The primary justification for
relying on efficiency as a payoff criterion is that employees have direct control over the factors
that influence efficiency and therefore could do something about those in order to receive a
bonus.
Unlike the traditional efficiency driven plans rooted in the manufacturing sector, custom
designed gainsharing programs (which account for a major portion of the recent growth of these
aggregate incentives across a broad spectrum of industries) tend to rely on complex payoff
formulas idiosyncratic to the firm (Markman et al., 1992). The bonus criteria may include
meeting deadlines, quality, customer satisfaction, safety, cooperation with other units,
innovation, accounting performance and market share. They may or may not emphasize
efficiency (Wallace, 1990).
There is virtually no published scholarly research on how these multifaceted bonus
formulas affect employee reactions to gainsharing and their relative success. Many research
questions come to mind in this regard. For instance: How do employees cognitively decide
which portion of the formula is most important and should be maximized, perhaps at the
expense of other elements in the formula? How do employees react to the greater risk inherent
in a bonus formula where some of the elements can not be directly controlled? How does the
"mix" of the bonus formula affect employee behaviors (e.g., proportion of "controllable" over
"less controllable" factors)? What is the behavioral impact of a complex reinforcement schedule
with varying targets (i.e., one for each portion of the formula)? How do firms utilize customized
formulas to implement their business strategies? How do aggregate multidimensional
performance criteria modify the theoretical predictions discussed earlier (in terms of
participation, expectancies, agency costs, social dilemmas and the like)? Answers to questions
such as these are important given that greater firm flexibility in designing the incentive
properties of the reward formula is a major impetus for the increased adoption of gainsharing,
particularly outside the manufacturing sector (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992a).
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Committee decision making
Despite all the emphasis on interpersonal processes in the participative management
research reviewed earlier, little is known about how the composition of gainsharing committees
influence decisions concerning the generation, evaluation, and implementation of suggestions.
There is a growing body of knowledge on organizational demography and cultural diversity that
may be brought to bear on these issues (e.g., Wiersema & Bird, 1993; Watson, Kumar, &
Michaelsen, 1993; Tsui, Egan, & O'Reilly, III, 1992). This literature suggests that group
membership affects team outcomes such as productivity and creativity of solutions.
As organizations become increasingly heterogeneous in terms of ethnicity, age, race,
gender and the like, the effectiveness of participative gainsharing programs may depend in part
on how team members are assigned. For instance, some have argued that greater intragroup
diversity stimulates flexibility, change, innovation and comprehensive decision making, all of
which enhance the performance of the team (Cox, 1991). One could therefore hypothesize that
diverse gainsharing committees should exercise more ingenuity in coming up with new ideas
and make better decisions when choosing among alternative options. On the other hand, it is
possible that less diverse groups are "more likely to have a stronger culture with shared values,
terminology, and belief structures [which] facilitate communication, problem solving, and fast
decision-making" (Glick, Miller, & Huber, 1993: 176).
Which of the two scenarios noted in the preceding paragraph is better or worse in terms
of gainsharing outcomes may depend on the environmental context and committee stability. An
empirical study by Glick et al. (1993) found that employee diversity makes a greater contribution
to performance in turbulent environments, such as those encountered by many high technology
firms. Watson et al. (1993) reports that for long standing committees greater heterogeneity
leads to better group outcomes. However, for short term, transient teams less diversity
produces better results because less time is required for members to adapt to each other. In
any case, the whole area of group decision making processes provide fertile grounds for future
research on gainsharing. For those interested in these types of issues existing gainsharing
programs provide a natural laboratory for hypothesis testing.
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